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Recruiting the constructs of legitimacy, power and interest, together with a social 
network analysis approach, this research identifies the key stakeholders in Public-
Private Partnerships (PPP) infrastructure projects and delineates their involvement in 
United Kingdom (UK) infrastructure provision.  PPP is a provision mechanism 
capable of delivering more and better infrastructure, nevertheless, it continues to be 
associated with problems.  Defined as a collaboration between the public and private 
sectors, there is consensus that inherent relationships are a primary source of poor 
project performance.  Literature shows that successful partnerships nurture 
stakeholder collaboration, yet an absence of defined systems and mechanisms to 
identify stakeholders has manifested in little agreement as to who ought to be 
involved in these arrangements.  This research fills this knowledge gap.  Through the 
application of Stakeholder Theory, this research determines and profiles the key 
stakeholders in PPP infrastructure projects.  Contingent on their contractual 
relationship, the findings of this investigation ascertain the key stakeholders to be the 
private sector Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) and its constituent members; financiers, 
construction contractors, facilities management contractors, and the public sector 
Authority.  From an examination of these stakeholders and the PPP 'environment', 
two relationship dynamics are identified.  These relationships transition at financial 
close, at construction completion and at refinancing.  This research adds to knowledge 
by not only contributing a framework to identify and understand PPP stakeholders, 
but also by imparting the fundamentals of these key stakeholders, enhancing their 
understanding, thereby providing the foundations on which to construct improved 
partnering arrangements. 
Keywords: public-private partnerships, infrastructure provision, stakeholder 
identification 
INTRODUCTION 
Attributable to its fundamental role in socioeconomic development, internationally, 
future infrastructure provision is being prioritised and estimated to equate to almost 
$80 trillion between 2014 and 2030 (Inderst and Stewart, 2014).  Equally, in the UK, 
there are pertinent signposts indicating a necessity to counter historical under-
investment and upgrade much needed services and facilities (NAO, 2015).  A failure 
to keep investment pace with other nations has meant that UK infrastructure now 
ranks 24th internationally and has subsequently fallen behind many of its competitors 
(WEF, 2016).  HM Treasury (2011) states "Britain will not be able to compete in the 
modern world unless we improve our infrastructure".  To alleviate these deficiencies, 
under the auspices of the UK government, public and private sector funding will be 
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channelled into both economic and social infrastructure through strategised schemes 
including the National Infrastructure Plan (NIP) and the Priority School Building 
Programme (PSBP).  A model earmarked to play a role in this recovery is Public-
Private Partnerships (PPP). 
PPP are regarded as being situated somewhere between traditional procurement and 
full privatisation and are characterised by a whole life-cycle approach.  Both public 
and private sectors are involved not only in the asset construction but also during the 
operations of the service (Raganelli and Fidone, 2007).  The private sector, over a 
range of contractual mechanisms and performance regimes is typically responsible for 
design, construction, financing, management and operations of a service.  A revenue is 
accordingly paid to the private sector for the services provided.  PPP can thus be 
defined as a fixed 25 to 35 year arrangement between the public and private sectors; 
sharing risks, resources and rewards, to deliver infrastructure projects whereby 
financing comes from the private sector for the provision of public sector services. 
In the UK, PPP, and in particular the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) have been 
previously operationalised across 722 projects with a total capital value of £57.7 
billion for the provision of schools, hospitals, roads and prisons (HM Treasury, 2016).  
Nevertheless, despite having accounted for some 10-14% of capital budgets annually, 
in more recent years, appetite for this procurement model has lessened.  UK PPP 
models repeatedly have been associated with problems.  Conflicting objectives, 
undefined roles and responsibilities, as well as an absence of trust, are just some 
factors which have detracted from partnering arrangements.  Subsequently, literature 
signposts stakeholder relationships are a primary source of poor project performance 
(Roehrich et al., 2014). 
In spite of this prominence however, within this body of literature, there is discord as 
to who overtly should be considered a PPP stakeholder and thus involved in these 
arrangements; across literature, 15 stakeholders have been proposed.  Against this 
backdrop, it is argued, before these relationships can be improved, there is firstly a 
forthcoming necessity to address this disparity.  To do this, this research adopts the 
rudiments of stakeholder theory to determine the attributes of stakeholders and the 
mechanisms by which to understand them.  Following this, this will be contextualised 
to PPP, critically providing the essential building blocks on which to nurture improved 
stakeholder relationships.  This research thus has three objectives: the first is to 
conceptualise stakeholder theory within the context of PPP, secondly, to identify PPP 
stakeholders, and finally to determine PPP stakeholder relationships. 
STAKEHOLDER THEORY 
The origination of stakeholders in literature can be recorded back to the Stanford 
Research Institute in 1963, appearing in an international memorandum, however 
Freeman (1984) is often credited with the introduction of stakeholder theory into the 
management arena with his landmark publication “Strategic Management: A 
Stakeholder Approach” (Donaldson and Preston, 1995).  Stakeholder theory evolved 
out of corporate social responsibility, organisation theory, systems theory and 
corporate planning giving consideration to ethical, social and economic concerns.  
Freeman (1984) claimed stakeholder theory is centred on “the principle of who or 
what really counts”, offering approaches for organisational management to consider 
the interests of other parties.  Donaldson and Preston (1995) demonstrated that 
stakeholder theory though essentially normative, can be divided into three theoretical 
taxonomies: 'descriptive' explains the behaviour and characteristics of the firm, and its 
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perception of others, 'instrumental' seeks to verify the linkage between organisations, 
whereas 'normative' describes the role of moral guidelines for operation and 
management of corporations.  Within this paradigm, to understand stakeholders, 
stakeholder theory has commonly recruited the attributes of power and interest.  
Power is defined as the ability of an organisation to impose its will to bring about the 
outcomes which they desire (Salancik and Pfeffer, 1974) while interest pertains to 
levels of attention or involvement (OED, 2016).  Equally, just as some have 
endeavoured to understand stakeholders, others have tendered several approaches to 
stakeholder identification.  Though approaches remain somewhat disputed, the 
construct of legitimacy is commonly central to these systems.  Freeman (1984) 
suggested that anyone with a stake who can affect the organisation should be regarded 
as being legitimate and subsequently is deserving of attention, regardless of the nature 
of their claims.  Differently, Donaldson and Preston (1995) were of the opinion that 
legitimacy seeks to differentiate between those who can influence and those who have 
a moral claim.  On the other hand, Philips (2003) argued that by possessing influence 
regardless of a moral claim, these parties, in line with the very notion of stake holding, 
cannot be excluded.  Rather than discount these actors, he proposed a nomenclature of 
stakeholders consisting of normative, derivative and non-stakeholders.  Normative 
stakeholders 'are those whom the organisation has a moral obligation', derivative are 
'those whose actions and claims must be accounted for by managers due to their 
potential effects upon the organisation and its normative stakeholders', and non-
stakeholders are those who possess neither influence nor a moral claim and can be 
excluded.  Yet, just as this approach accounts for those with influence and those with 
claims, Phillips (2003) noted it may be difficult to distinguish between normative and 
derivative stakeholders. 
Application of stakeholder theory to Public-Private Partnerships 
To contextualise stakeholder theory to PPP, the fundamentals of this paradigm must 
be restructured.  In stakeholder theory, its descriptive stance dictates the 'firm', i.e. the 
client, is the central organisation and thus their perception of others determines the 
involvement and management of these bodies.  However, PPP differs from 
conventional provision models.  Defined as an arrangement for the collaborative 
provision of a public service between the public and private sectors, organisations 
inherent to each sector share roles, responsibilities and financing.  In turn, this blurs 
the conventional position of the client as the focal organisation (De Schepper et al., 
2014).  A PPP project can better be described as an 'environment' with multiple 
stakeholders and multiple relationships.  As such, a social network analysis approach 
is more appropriate vis-à-vis the traditional stakeholder theory dyadic perspective.  A 
social network analysis approach surpasses the limitations of the conventional focal 
organisation or its associated boundaries.  Rather, it looks to the wider environment to 
understand connections between stakeholders, the nature of the linkages, and, the role 
that each stakeholder performs (Smyth and Pryke, 2008).  Still, before these 
connections can be examined, from within these two broad bodies it must firstly be 
determined who PPP stakeholders are. 
Returning to Phillips' (2003) notion of legitimacy, De Schepper et al., (2014) deemed 
the contractual relationship and relationships of the perception of norms, values and 
beliefs to be determinant in distinguishing normative and derivative Belgian PPP 
stakeholders.  This research, similarly utilising Phillips' (2003) taxonomy, conversely 
argues that, relationships of norms, values and beliefs are subjective on the assertion 
these perceptions will differ predicated on your sectoral position.  The private sector, 
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traditionally, is motivated by returns and profit and therefore holds different 
perceptions to that possessed by the public sector; who typically pursue improved 
social well-being.  As a result, the only tangible measure can be the contract and an 
organisation's relationship with it.   
Contingent on this understanding of legitimacy, this research identifies PPP normative 
stakeholders as the Authority and the Special Purpose Vehicle, and its constituent 
members.  By contrast, all other stakeholders can be defined as derivative.  However, 
it is noteworthy to consider Donaldson and Prestons' (1995) proffering, namely, 
stakeholder theory is fundamentally normative.  It is therefore reasoned the key 
stakeholders are the Authority and the SPV, and its constituent members. 
Authority 
In PPP, unlike other procurement models, the Authority is the public sector 
organisation directly involved in the delivery of the infrastructure asset.  It is 
traditionally driven by Value for Money (VfM), cost savings, improved services 
provision, and social and public benefits (Zou et al., 2013).  In a change from the 
traditional transaction structure of PFI, PF2s initial operation in the PSBP will see the 
central government acts as the Authority, the Education Funding Agency (EFA).  
Through defining objectives and outcomes, the Authority can ensure the requirements 
of the project are achieved and thus safeguard the interests of the wider public.  The 
Authority will, as Grimsey and Lewis (2004) describe, ‘wear many “hats”’ meaning 
they will fulfil a number of roles, including: defining the business case, determining 
output and performance requirements, planning and executing the procurement 
process, govern the contract, liaise with the community and co-operate with the SPV 
to overcome changes in the project.  Notably, despite being directly involved in the 
project delivery, the Authority is ultimately accountable to central governmental 
departments and, essentially, parliament (Shaoul et al., 2012). 
Special Purpose Vehicle 
The private sector supplier is a consortium of organisations which collectively operate 
through a project company often referred to as a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) or 
project company.  This is a commercial entity formed specifically by the cohort for 
the purpose of undertaking the project and is responsible for producing, funding and 
delivering the infrastructure asset (Grimsey and Lewis, 2004).  The SPV negotiates 
and enters into a contractual agreement for the financing, designing, building, 
management and operating of the facility with the Authority.  Its members enter into a 
contract between themselves and the SPV, rather than being directly contracted with 
the purchaser.  In doing so, this allows the supplier to bundle together solutions and 
specific skillsets needed across differing phases of the project (Roehrich and Caldwell, 
2012).  This facilitates the achievement of economies of scale, innovation and risk 
sharing among other benefits.  This consortium is traditionally commercially pursuant 
seeking; profitability and increased revenue (Zou et al., 2013) and comprises 
financiers and contractors. 
Debt holders 
Debt holders are commonly sourced from financing institutions such as banks, 
infrastructure funds or institutional investors, and their interests are centred on 
consistent returns, however, more recently the balance of these institutions has shifted.  
With the decline of the debt market resonant of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), the 
introduction of new banking regulations and the decline of the monoline insurance 
market has made it increasingly difficult to raise debt financing.  As such, the notion 
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of attracting alternative sources of finance is currently prevalent with HM Treasury 
(2012) encouraging increased earlier involvement, particularly from institutional 
investors such as pension schemes and insurance funds.  The number of lenders in an 
already limited market has lessened, affecting both debt provision and lending to 
equity investors. 
Equity holders 
These are commonly constituted from SPV members for legal and accounting 
purposes appointed with the responsibilities of the development, construction, and 
operation of the facility, contracted with the SPV.  Additionally, third party equity 
investors may also directly invest in the project.  Post construction, it is not 
uncommon for equity and debt holders to sell off shares to secondary markets or 
refinance their investments at lower interest rates (Demirag et al., 2015).  
Furthermore, PF2 will now see the inclusion of a central public sector equity 
stakeholder positioned within the SPV. 
Contractors 
These typically include design and build (D&B) contractors, facilities management 
(FM) contractors and often other specialist contractors (Grimsey and Lewis, 2004).  
Though many of these contractors may be equity holders, their remits lay in the 
provision and delivery of the asset.  D&B contractors work to an output specification 
and are granted the freedom to design innovative solutions.  Typically, their roles and 
responsibilities include collaborating with the Authority and other SPV stakeholders 
to design and construct the facility.  These contractors usually have short term 
objectives: seeking to maximise profits and the flexibility to move onto other projects 
post construction (Demirag et al., 2015).  Different to traditional procurement, PPP 
holds greater importance for operational contractors.  The facilities management (FM) 
contractor's roles involve inputting into the design and liaising with the D&B 
contractors, collaborating with the Authority, and ultimately being entrusted with the 
responsibility of operations of the infrastructure (Hardcastle and Boothroyd, 2003).  
Their mandate is to ensure the effective life-cycle functioning of the asset (Consoli, 
2006). 
FINDINGS 
Applying a stakeholder theory social network perspective coupled with the attributes 
of power and interest to PPP, figures 1, 2 and 3 have been constructed.  These figures 
delineate the transitional relationships between PPP stakeholders.  Stakeholder 
relationships are identified as altering in the procurement, construction and 
operational phases.  
Within these phases, two relational dynamics have been recognised.  This is the 
macro-level relationship; the formalised contractual agreement between the Authority 
and the SPV.  This is represented by the arrowed line.  In addition to this on-going 
long-term arrangement, there are also micro relationships.  These secondary 
relationships comprise interactions within the SPV, and between SPV members and 
the Authority.  This is signified by a single line. 
Macro-level relationship 
The macro-level relationship exists between the Authority and the SPV.  This is an 
on-going dyad that will run for the duration of the project, though literature signposts 
the principal dynamic shift in this relationship occurs at financial close as both parties 
become contractually bound (Chinyere and Xu, 2012).   
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Pre-financial close (figure 1), the nature of the environment is commercially charged 
as the Authority seeks to encourage competition to maximise VfM (Barlow and 
Köberle-Gaiser, 2008).  This is represented through the broken arrowed line.  The 
Authority is responsible for undertaking tasks including: defining the required service, 
appraising of project viability and evaluating alternatives, producing a business case, 
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and commencing the project development (Grimsey and Lewis, 2007).  SPV teams 
compete for the project, with a preferred bidder being selected to enter into contract 
negotiations (Barlow and Köberle-Gaiser, 2008).  Leading up to financial close, the 
nature of this relationship is tentative, with little security of project progression, 
however, as both organisations approach a contractual agreement, the platforms of the 
purchaser/provider, together with the dynamics of the relationship transition (Barlow 
and Köberle-Gaiser, 2008).  Previously, both organisations are separate entities, 
however, through formalising the contract, both stakeholders agree to enter into a 
partnership for the collective delivery and management of the project.  The 
construction of these sustainable relationships becomes critical in that these 
stakeholders are now reliant upon each other for the project success.  This is indicated 
through the solidifying of the broken arrowed line. 
Micro-level relationship 
While the macro relationship is somewhat straightforward, comparatively, the micro 
arrangements are much more intricate and complex.  Under threat of potentially 
incurring monetary penalties for poor asset provision, the nature of the internal SPV 
relationships are performance orientated.  Pursuing economic advantage, 
consequently, every stakeholder’s actions affect all other SPV stakeholders.  Though 
there is continual interaction between all stakeholders across all stages of the project, 
to understand PPP micro relationships it is pertinent to return to Roehrich and 
Caldwell’s (2012) aforementioned assertion: i.e. the SPV will unbundle roles and 
responsibilities contingent upon the project phase.  By virtue of this ‘unbundling’ of 
tasks, differing SPV stakeholders' power and interests will transition and thus 
determine stakeholder relationships not only inherent to the SPV, but also 
corresponding to the Authority.  Therefore, in addition to internal SPV networks, 
micro relationships are also constituted from SPV member-Authority arrangements. 
In the procurement phase, though the D&B, and FM contractors are involved, they are 
lesser roles comparative to the front-ended financier involvement (Zheng et al., 2008).  
This heavy early involvement may be explained by the high levels of uncertainty and 
risks in the procurement phase prior to financial close (Chinyere and Xu, 2012).  This 
reasoning is pertinent when coupled with Demirag et al., (2015) who claimed that, 
conventionally, debt funders are risk adverse; seeking to balance risk/reward profiles.  
Chinyere and Xu (2012) asserted project lenders, in the earlier phases, are 
instrumental; undertaking strong supervisory roles pertaining to design, organising the 
SPV, negotiating arrangements with the Authority, and positioning constituent 
stakeholders.  On these grounds, the financial stakeholders possess high levels of both 
power and interest.  This relational dimension is reflected through the solid line 
exhibited between the financiers, the SPV, and the Authority in figure 1.  The 
auxiliary roles, i.e. D&B and FM contractors, are represented through the broken lines 
on the grounds that these stakeholders are not yet directly involved in the provision 
and delivery of the service and therefore possess lower levels of power and interest. 
Following financial close, micro relationships shift.  Having secured the project, 
financier interests lessen; reflected through the broken line.  Though there are still 
high levels of risk during the construction phase, these can be mitigated and managed 
through fixed price contracts (Burke and Demirag, 2015; Demirag et al., 2015).  
Notably, however, when a risk of delay is presented jeopardising returns, the interests 
of financiers can shift manifested through the exertion of pressure on other SPV 
stakeholders.  This is also the case during operations (Zheng et al., 2008).  
Accordingly, the dimensions of the SPV will evolve.  Different to the procurement 
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phase, D&B contractors are now directly involved and thus possess high levels of 
interest and power.  The D&B contractors are typically responsible for the provision 
and commissioning of the asset.  Determined by an output specification, the D&B 
contractors will collaborate with the Authority and other SPV stakeholders to 
construct the asset on time and within budget (Roehrich and Caldwell, 2012).  During 
construction, again similar to the procurement phase, the FM will have input, 
although, they have no direct involvement in the provision of the asset.  These 
dimensions are reflected in figure 2.  The solid lines between the D&B contractors, the 
Authority and the SPV indicate these dynamics in the construction phase. 
Having completed its mandate of designing and building the facility, the project will 
progress to the operational phase (figure 3).  FM interest and power will increase as 
this stakeholder is responsible for the performance of the asset.  This is exhibited by 
the changing relationships between themselves, the SPV and the Authority (Roehrich 
and Caldwell, 2012).  Following construction, the profile for risk is dramatically 
reduced.  There is resultantly little requirement for direct financial involvement and 
thus little interest.  However, as before mentioned, while this is not always the case, it 
is common for debt and equity holders to refinance or sell off their shares to a 
secondary market (Demirag et al., 2015).  It is common for ‘bond shareholders’ such 
as pension or insurance funds to enter a project, replacing primary financiers.  These 
stakeholders are typically risk adverse, preferring not to invest until the asset is 
operational, avoiding construction risks and uncertainties (Buchanan et al., 2014).  
Likewise, equity shares are often sold by the constructors to other SPV stakeholders or 
less active third-party equity investors as they seek to recycle funds to grant them the 
freedom to move onto other projects (Demirag et al., 2015).  Reduced risk, little 
involvement, re-financing as well as the entering of secondary market financiers, the 
interests in the provision of the asset of financiers remain low and as such is 
represented through staggered line.  However, the relationships and interests within 
this stakeholder grouping are changing.  This dynamic is represented through the solid 
line between ‘debt’, ‘equity’ and ‘financier’ stakeholders.  Furthermore, D&B 
contractors, selling off their equity investments and moving onto other projects, have 
been removed from the diagram. 
RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS 
Within PPP, stakeholder relationships have been discerned as a primary source of 
poor project performance.  Appropriately, the topics of relationships, relationship 
management and collaboration are currently prevalent.  Still, despite this growing 
body of literature, the fundamentals of these arrangements are not yet fully understood 
or defined.  PPP arrangements differ from traditional procurement as a result of the 
sharing of roles and responsibilities.  A manifestation of this blurring has been little 
agreement between PPP stakeholders.  It is argued, there is a knowledge gap 
pertaining to PPP stakeholders meaning existing literature fails to effectively address 
many of the inherent relational issues.  This research addresses this knowledge gap 
and has two significant implications.  Firstly, it offers an original PPP framework 
grounded in stakeholder theory to identify and understand stakeholders.  In doing so, 
this research offers a set of principles, as opposed to a definitive list which runs the 
risk of excluding potential future stakeholders.  Indeed, an example of this is apparent 
in the introduction of PF2.  PF2 will now see a central public sector body now directly 
invest into project equity.  Though deemed to still be in its infancy, by employing this 
study's definition of legitimacy, this organisation can be determined as a stakeholder.  
Secondly, utilising this framework, this research applies these principles to existing 
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literature.  Centred on legitimacy, PPP stakeholders have been identified.  Equally, 
adopting the constructs of power and interest, the study has provided an understanding 
of these stakeholders, in turn contributing the essential building blocks of these 
relationships to inform future research.  The UK government has declared its 
commitment to PPP and no doubt future variants of these models will continue to be 
mechanised.  As PPP models continue to develop and evolve in the UK, this 
potentially will bring about new stakeholders.  As such, this will see the evolution of 
existing relationships but also significantly the creation of new unknown dynamics.  
Nevertheless, through the application of this framework, despite the advancement of 
future PPP arrangements, these stakeholders can continue to be identified and 
understood. 
CONCLUSION 
This investigation, grounded in stakeholder theory has contributed to knowledge by 
not only providing an original insight into existing PPP stakeholder relationships, but 
also by contributing a set of principles to understand future arrangements.  By doing 
so, this study provides the vital foundations to inform future PPP stakeholder 
relationship research. 
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